Multi-Photon Entanglement Concentration and Quantum Cryptography by Durkin, Gabriel A. et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
01
09
13
2v
2 
 5
 Ju
n 
20
02
Multi-Photon Entanglement Concentration and Quantum Cryptography
Gabriel A. Durkin1, Christoph Simon1, and Dik Bouwmeester1,2
1 Centre for Quantum Computation, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3PU, United Kingdom
2 Department of Physics, Center for Spintronics and Quantum Computation,
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA
(Dated: October 25, 2018)
Multi-photon states from parametric down-conversion can be entangled both in polarization and
photon number. Maximal high-dimensional entanglement can be concentrated post-selectively from
these states via photon counting. This makes them natural candidates for quantum key distribution,
where the presence of more than one photon per detection interval has up to now been considered
as undesirable. We propose a simple multi-photon cryptography protocol for the case of low losses.
Parametric down-conversion is a convenient way of cre-
ating entangled states of light [1]. So far it has been ex-
plored in two separate regimes. Experiments on the few-
photon level have often relied on polarization entangle-
ment [2], while experiments with macroscopic amounts of
light have observed two-mode squeezing, that is entangle-
ment in photon number [3]. It is however possible to build
sources that combine both kinds of entanglement. The
basic principle has recently been demonstrated [4]. Such
a source can be seen as a pair of phase-coherent two-mode
squeezers. We will show that from this point of view
photon counting can be used as a post-selective realiza-
tion of entanglement concentration for continuous vari-
able states. Maximal high-dimensional entanglement can
be extracted in this way from the multi-photon states.
It is natural to consider the application of this entan-
glement for quantum key distribution. For the original
quantum cryptography protocols [5, 6] the presence of
more than one photon in a single pulse or detection in-
terval is a problem for security. Therefore implementa-
tions of key distribution [7] are usually restricted to weak
transmission signals, with a low probability of containing
even a single photon, limiting the achievable bit rate per
pulse. The pulse rate itself is mainly limited by the dead
time of the photon detectors. Here we take a more pos-
itive approach to multi-photon states in cryptography.
We ask whether they can be used to improve the capac-
ity of the secure channel. We propose a simple protocol
which leads to a significant increase in bit rates for the
case of low losses.
We will first describe our proposed post-selective re-
alization of entanglement concentration for continuous-
variable states. Entanglement concentration is a proce-
dure that allows two parties Alice and Bob to extract
maximal entanglement from non-maximally entangled
pure states using only local operations and classical com-
munication [8]. Consider the (un-normalized) two-mode
squeezed state
|ψ1〉 =
∞∑
l=0
λl|l〉ah |l〉bv (1)
where λ is usually referred to as the squeezing parameter.
For later convenience, we have assumed that the photons
in the spatial mode a (going to Alice) are horizontally
and those in mode b (going to Bob) are vertically polar-
ized. This state represents photon-number entanglement
between modes ah and bv, that is, a quantum superposi-
tion of different states for which the number of photons
in mode ah and bv are the same. The state is however not
maximally entangled since λ is always smaller than unity
and therefore the individual terms in the superposition
have different weights.
Based on ref. [9] we describe a way to concentrate
photon-number entanglement. Suppose that in addition
to (1) Alice and Bob are also given the state |ψ2〉 =∑∞
m=0(−λ)m|m〉av |m〉bh , which differs from (1) by the
sign of the squeezing parameter and by the polarization
of the photons in modes a and b. The total state is then
given by:
|Ψ〉 = |ψ1〉|ψ2〉 =
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
m=0
λl+m(−1)m|l〉ah |m〉av |m〉bh |l〉bv .
(2)
Defining n = l + m, rearranging terms and using the
short-hand notation |u, v;w, x〉 for |u〉ah |v〉av |w〉bh |x〉bv
yields
|Ψ〉 =
∞∑
n=0
λn
(
n∑
m=0
(−1)m|(n−m),m;m, (n−m)〉
)
,
(3)
where we have collected the terms with the same number
of photons n received by Alice and Bob.
Entanglement concentration could now be achieved by
performing a projection measurement onto a specific pho-
ton number. For a given n, this results in a superposition
state of n+ 1 equally weighted terms. It is evident from
(3) that each term satisfies (Nv − Nh)a = (Nh − Nv)b.
From our subsequent discussion it will become clear that
these perfect correlations in photon number difference
exist not only in the h/v polarization basis, but in any
basis. This is a consequence of the maximal entangle-
ment in (3), i.e. of the fixed phase relations between the
different |(n−m),m;m, (n−m)〉 terms.
2At first glance, the above scheme seems to require
a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement of the
photon number on each side in order to project onto
a fixed value of n = (Nv + Nh)a = (Nv + Nh)b with-
out losing the possibility of measuring (Nv − Nh)a and
(Nh − Nv)b afterwards. Ways of realizing such a QND
measurement were discussed in [9], but it is very difficult
to implement. On the other hand, destructive photon
counting is feasible. It is therefore important to real-
ize that for many applications it is not strictly necessary
to perform the n projection before the (Nv − Nh)a and
(Nh − Nv)b measurements. They can be performed si-
multaneously by simply measuring (Nv)a, (Nh)a, (Nh)b
and (Nh)b independently. The basis of polarization anal-
ysis can be varied, permitting the observation of perfect
correlations in more than one basis. This approach is
similar to the post-selection strategy that enabled the
demonstration of quantum teleportation [10] and related
single-photon experiments.
Clearly, one should be careful in referring to a post-
selection method as a concentration scheme since no con-
centrated output state is obtained. However, for the pur-
pose of quantum cryptography the post-selection method
will suffice, since it allows to establish perfect correlations
between Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results.
In quantum key distribution, to prevent eavesdropping
it is essential that perfect correlations are obtained in at
least two complementary bases. If there were perfect cor-
relations only in one basis, the eavesdropper could make
her measurements in this basis, and the process would
not be secure. We now show that, due to our specific
choice of relative phases, the state (3) is symmetric under
a joint rotation of polarisation bases through equal an-
gles in modes ‘a’ and ‘b’. Therefore, the state exhibits the
same photon-number difference correlations in, for exam-
ple, the linear polarization basis rotated by 45◦. We also
show how such a symmetric state (3) can be generated in
a natural way using type-II parametric down-conversion.
Parametric down-conversion is a process where a pho-
ton from a pump light source can be split into two pho-
tons of lower frequency within a non-linear optical crys-
tal. One can experimentally achieve conditions where a
good approximation for the relevant interaction Hamil-
tonian is
Hˆ = κ(aˆ†hbˆ
†
v − aˆ†v bˆ†h) + h.c., (4)
where the complex number κ is the product of the am-
plitude of the pump beam and the relevant non-linear
coefficient of the crystal. This is the familiar Hamilto-
nian for the creation of polarization entangled photon
pairs [2], which has been the basis for many experiments
in quantum information. Using the normal ordering the-
orem of [11] one can show that this Hamiltonian leads to
the production of entangled photon states of the follow-
ing form:
|ψ〉 = exp(−iHˆt/h¯)|0〉
=
1
cosh2(τ)
∞∑
n=0
√
n+ 1 tanhn(τ) |ψn−〉, (5)
where τ = κt
h¯
is the effective interaction time and
|ψn−〉 =
1√
n+ 1
1
n!
(aˆ†hbˆ
†
v − aˆ†v bˆ†h)n|0〉
=
1√
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
(−1)m|(n−m),m; m, (n−m)〉 .(6)
The total state (5) has exactly the form of state (3).
The terms |ψn−〉, which correspond to n photons on each
side, are maximally entangled states shared between Al-
ice and Bob in a Hilbert space of (n + 1) × (n + 1) di-
mensions. Similar states were studied in the context of
Bell’s inequalities in [12]. They are all invariant under
joint identical polarization transformations by Alice and
Bob, since they are created by the application to the vac-
uum of powers of the operator (aˆ†hbˆ
†
v− aˆ†v bˆ†h), whose form
is conserved under such transformations. These proper-
ties make them generalized singlet states, which moti-
vates our notation |ψn−〉. Whenever Alice has (n − m)
photons polarized along a certain direction and m pho-
tons polarized along the orthogonal one, Bob has m and
(n −m) photons of the respective polarizations. When
employed for quantum key distribution, every pair of val-
ues (m,n−m) constitutes a letter in the cryptographical
alphabet.
A simple key distribution protocol using the multi-
photon states proceeds in the following way. From a
common source, entangled multi-photon pulses are sent
to Alice and Bob via modes a and b. Alice and Bob each
independently and randomly choose one of two comple-
mentary bases, h/v and h’/v’, in which to perform their
photon number measurements. Here, the primed basis
is rotated by 45◦ with respect to the unprimed basis.
These measurements act as a post-selective multi-photon
entanglement concentration resulting in detected corre-
lations associated with the states |ψn−〉, where n is the
number of detected photons on each side. They commu-
nicate their basis choice via classical means and extract
the key from the photon number difference recorded in
those cases where they had chosen the same basis. Fi-
nally, Alice and Bob examine a randomly chosen part of
the key for errors. In the ideal case any amount of errors
indicates the presence of an eavesdropper.
It is clear that in the absence of losses the achievable
bit rate increases significantly with the number of pho-
tons because the number of distinguishable measurement
outcomes increases. There are n + 1 different possible
measurement results for the state |ψn−〉. For protocols
based on the multi-photon states |ψn−〉, photon losses in-
troduce errors because the state after losses no longer has
3the perfect correlations expected. We will model photon
losses by the action of beam-splitters introduced to each
of the four modes (ah, av, bh, bv). The probabilities for
the measurement of particular photon numbers in each
mode can be calculated using a positive operator valued
measure (POVM). The operator associated with a mea-
surement of ‘n’ photons in mode ah (behind the beam-
splitter) is
Pˆn = η
n
∞∑
m=0
(m+ n)!
m!n!
(1− η)m|n+m〉ah〈n+m| (7)
Here, η is the transmission coefficient of the beam-
splitter, and corresponds to the overall quantum effi-
ciency of the system, including lossy lines and imperfect
detectors. Each term in (7) corresponds to a certain num-
ber of photons m that were lost. We assume the same
amount of loss in all four photon modes. Probabilities
of specific outcomes are calculated by taking the expec-
tation value of the associated POVMs with the down-
conversion state Eq.(5). Thus the probabilities are func-
tions only of η and τ .
The information shared between Alice and Bob can be
quantified by the mutual information [13]:
IAB =
∑
A,B p(Ai, Bj)log2p(Ai, Bj)∑
i p(Ai)log2p(Ai)
∑
i p(Bi)log2p(Bi)
, (8)
which is a function of the joint probabilities for Alice’s
and Bob’s measurement results, denoted by Ai and Bj
respectively. An outcome labelled Ai corresponds to a
particular pair of photon-numbers measurement made on
Alice’s side; it will be of form (n−k) photons in mode ah
(ah′), and k photons in mode av (av′), where the basis of
polarization analysis depends on her choice.
In quantum cryptography, Alice and Bob have to as-
sume that all errors that seem to be due to losses could
actually be the consequence of eavesdropping, with the
eavesdropper Eve simulating the effect of lossy lines. In
such a situation, Eve will have some knowledge about
Alice’s and Bob’s results, quantified by the mutual infor-
mations IAE , IBE . In the presence of an eavesdropper,
the number of secure shared bits that Alice and Bob can
distill by privacy amplification techniques [14] is denoted
the ‘secrecy capacity’ Cs , and is limited by the inequality
[15]:
Cs ≥ IAB −min(IAE , IBE). (9)
Determining the achievable secure bit rates in principle
requires an analysis of all possible eavesdropping strate-
gies. This is a difficult task in the present situation since
the system under consideration is very complex. In this
paper, as a first step, we consider a specific key distri-
bution protocol where Alice and Bob make use of the
4-photon detection results (each detects 2 photons) in
addition to the 2-photon results (each detects 1 photon).
We have compared this case to the standard protocol
which exclusively uses the 2-photon results [7]. As for
the eavesdropping strategy, we suppose that Eve’s tech-
nology is so powerful that she can replace the lossy trans-
mission lines, unknown to Alice and Bob, by ideal ones.
Furthermore, we assume that Eve controls the source.
She is aware that Alice and Bob will monitor errors, and
tailors her interference to reproduce the error profiles ex-
pected. Indeed, there are two types of errors that Alice
and Bob can check.
The first type is the occurrence of photon number de-
tections different from one on each side or two on each
side. These results are produced under normal circum-
stances, despite not being used for key generation. Eve
has no choice but to replicate these signals, labelled be-
low in Eq.(10) as ρˆrest.
The second type of error occurs when Alice and Bob
both measure the same number of photons, but not the
ideal perfect correlations in polarization. Eve sends 2-
photon and 4-photon signals with the expected overall
probabilities, P1,1(η, τ), P2,2(η, τ), but does not always
send the singlet states, |ψ−
1
〉, |ψ−
2
〉, which give her no in-
formation, and give Alice and Bob perfect correlations.
Instead, a proportion of the time defined by γ, Eve sends
a product state with the correct correlations in one ba-
sis. She has no way of knowing the basis, ⊕ (h/v) or ⊗
(h’/v’) in which the legitimate users will measure, and is
forced to choose randomly. If she guesses correctly, she
has full knowledge of their results. However, when her
basis choice differs from that of Alice and Bob, she in-
troduces correlation errors on their measurements. The
percentage γ is constrained to produce exactly the fre-
quency of natural errors expected on the 2- and 4-photon
signals. Therefore it is also a function of η and τ . The
state produced by Eve’s source is:
ρˆEve = P1,1ρˆ1,1 + P2,2ρˆ2,2 + (1− P1,1 − P2,2)ρˆrest (10)
where for instance:
ρˆ1,1 = (1− γ)|ψ−1 〉〈ψ−1 |+
γ
4
(|1, 0; 0, 1〉⊗〈1, 0; 0, 1|+ |0, 1; 1, 0〉⊗〈0, 1; 1, 0|+ |1, 0; 0, 1〉⊕〈1, 0; 0, 1|+ |0, 1; 1, 0〉⊕〈0, 1; 1, 0|)
(11)
4The subscripts ⊕,⊗ label the two complementary polar-
isation bases in which each product state is defined. The
state ρˆ2,2 is defined analogously. From an explicit de-
scription of the full state as given above one can directly
calculate the joint probabilities for all possible measure-
ment outcomes, which determine each mutual informa-
tion and thus the minimum secrecy capacity.
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FIG. 1: The minimum achievable secure bit rate C
(min)
s Eq.
(9) for the multi-photon protocol is depicted in (a) upper
graph, in the context of the specific eavesdropping attack
mentioned in the text. To contrast, the equivalent measure for
the standard protocol, using 2-photon results only, is shown
in (a), lower graph. Graphs are plotted in terms of the over-
all transmission η, and the effective interaction time of the
source τ , cf. eq. (5). One sees that using 4-photon detections
in addition leads to a significant increase in secure bit rates
in the region of low losses. This is shown in more detail in
(b) where we have plotted C
(min)
s for both protocols, at their
optimal τ values; τ = 0.78 and τ = 0.70 for the multipho-
ton and standard protocols respectively. C
(min)
s decreases for
higher τ values, as can be seen clearly in (a), because the
probabilities for 2-photon and 4-photon results are reduced
as higher photon numbers become more likely.
The results are shown in figure 1. One sees that for
a comparatively low level of losses the minimum secrecy
capacity is approximately doubled by using the 4-photon
states in addition. This effect would be increased sub-
stantially by including higher photon numbers.
It should be noted in this context that efficient multi-
photon detectors [16] and optical fibres with very low
losses [17] are both under development. Currently, losses
and limited detection efficiencies are serious practical re-
strictions. One can see from fig. 1(b) that for the present
protocol the advantage of using the higher photon num-
ber states disappears for overall losses that exceed 35 %.
However, there is some indication that the multi-photon
states may still be viable candidates for quantum key
distribution for higher losses. The entanglement in the
states |ψ−n 〉 is quite robust under photon loss. We will
address this topic in a future publication. The entangle-
ment that remains after some loss could be purified and
then used for key distribution or other quantum commu-
nication tasks.
Natural applications for multi-photon entanglement in-
clude all-optical quantum error correction [18] and even
all-optical quantum computation [19]. The use of down-
conversion multi-photon states for these purposes is a
topic for future research.
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